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1 
Environmental Overreach: The EU’s Carbon 
Tax on International Aviation 
 




On November 27, 2012—without the fanfare of a Rose Garden 
ceremony—President Obama signed into law a bill that forbids United 
States airlines from participating in the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”). Environmental organizations bemoaned the 
President’s decision after having urged him to veto the bill. Supporters of 
the law hailed the passage as a win for American sovereignty, preventing 
an illegitimate and disingenuous environmental tax on U.S. carriers and 
passengers. This article addresses the aviation industry’s role in global 
climate change, and offers an in-depth analysis of the EU ETS and the 
European Commission’s decision to include international aviation in the 
ETS. It also discusses the legal implications of the EU’s Aviation Directive 
and the legal challenge before the European Court of Justice. Finally, this 
article discusses the aforementioned legislation and exposes the pitfalls of 
the EU’s unilateral action. 
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[T]he EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme, when applied to 
U.S. airlines, is the wrong way to achieve the right 
objective. It goes against international law and 
agreements, and it brings the hand of European regulators 
into our own airspace. The EU’s go-it-alone approach is 
not the way to find a global solution to a global problem.1 
~ Congressman Nick Rahall (D-W.Va.) 
 
Through the efficiency and reliability of global air travel, distant 
nations have been brought closer together in a way that was not 
contemplated even a hundred years ago.2 A trans-Atlantic trip that once 
took weeks has been reduced to mere hours. 3  As this means of 
transportation evolved through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, air 
travel has continued to be more accessible and affordable.4 Every year, 
                                                                                                                           
 1. 158 CONG. REC. H6,332 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2012) (statement of Rep. Nick Rahall).  
 2. See Jad Mouawad & Christopher Drew, Airline Industry at Its Safest Since the 
Dawn of the Jet Age, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2013, at A1 (“[F]lying has become so reliable 
that a traveler could fly every day for an average of 123,000 years before being in a fatal 
crash.”); U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT 4 (2012), available at 
http://airconsumer.dot.gov/reports/2012/September/2012SeptATCR.PDF (showing that 
seventy-six percent of commercial airline flights arrive on time); STEVEN A. MORRISON & 
CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 3 (1995) (describing the first 
American commercial plane flight in 1914, which was an eighteen mile voyage); BUREAU OF 
TRANSP., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., STATISTICS, FLIGHTS: ALL CARRIERS – ALL AIRPORTS 
(2012), available at http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=2 (showing that 
almost 1.4 million international flights took place in 2012) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 3. See Curtiss NC-4, SMITHSONIAN NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE MUSEUM, 
http://airandspace.si.edu/collections/artifact.cfm?id=A19270032000 (last visited Sept. 7, 
2013) (explaining that the first transatlantic flight, on the Curtiss NC-4, took twenty-four 
days) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT); Flights to New York, BRITISHAIRWAYS.COM, 
http://www.britishairways.com/en-gb/destinations/new-york/flights-to-new-york (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2013) (stating that a nonstop flight from London to New York takes seven hours 
thirty minutes) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 4. See GEORGE WILLIAMS, THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE IMPACT OF 
DEREGULATION 20 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the proliferation of major traffic hubs during 
the last quarter of the twentieth century and the drastic increase in passenger numbers during 
that time); MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 2, at 11 (showing that the average domestic 
air fare per passenger mile has fallen consistently since 1970). 
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about 2.2 billion passengers travel on the world’s air carriers, “with 
predictions of 9 billion passengers by 2025.” 5  There is no doubt that 
modern society has become dependent on aviation for day-to-day life.6  
As global air transportation increases,7 concerns over the amount of 
carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, ozone, and methane (collectively greenhouse 
gases, or GHGs) emitted from the aviation industry also escalate.8 Like any 
motor vehicle that runs on fossil fuels, aircrafts release gaseous and 
particulate emissions into the atmosphere.9 Aircrafts are unique, however, 
in that their emissions are injected directly into the atmosphere at high 
altitudes. 10  There is scientific consensus that cumulative anthropogenic 
GHG emissions are driving climate change,11 the precise effects of which 
are still being debated. 12  The fact remains that international aviation 
emissions represent only about two percent of total global carbon dioxide 
emissions, which is a tiny fraction of the overall anthropogenic emissions.13  
Over the last two decades, international bodies and national 
governments have attempted to curb emissions through various command-
                                                                                                                           
 5. INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, ICAO ENVTL. REPORT 116 (2010) 
[hereinafter ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT]. 
 6. See AIR TRANSPORT ACTION GROUP, AVIATION: BENEFITS BEYOND BORDERS 2 4 
(2012), available at 
http://aviationbenefitsbeyondborders.org/sites/aviationbenefitsbeyondborders.org/files/pdfs/
ABBB_Medium%20Res.pdf (explaining that 3.5% of global GDP is supported by aviation 
and that air transport carriers haul close to 35% of world trade by value). 
 7. See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 19 (stating that from 1989 
2009, total scheduled airline traffic grew at a yearly rate of 4.4%). 
 8. See id. at 69 (discussing the concern over climate change during the past decade 
and the increasing pressure on the aviation industry to reduce its impact on climate change). 
 9. See id. at 38 (stating that aircraft produce emissions much like those produced 
during fossil fuel combustion). 
 10. See Daniel B. Reagan, Note, Putting International Aviation into the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Can Europe Do It Flying Solo?, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 349, 349 (2008) (citing Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Aviation and the 
Global Atmosphere: Summary for Policy Makers, at 3 (1999)) (“Aircraft release gaseous and 
particulate emissions at high altitudes directly into the atmosphere.”). 
 11. See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 38 (“Global climate change 
is caused by the accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the lower atmosphere.”). 
 12. See Janelle Veno, Comment, Flying the Unfriendly Skies: The European Union’s 
New Proposal to Include Aviation in Their Emissions Trading Scheme, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 
659, 659 (2007) (stating that scientists around the world debate global warming as well as 
the effect it may have on the earth). 
 13. See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 38 (stating that aviation 
accounts for two percent of global carbon dioxide emissions and showing that carbon 
dioxide emissions from aviation make up a miniscule portion of the world’s anthropogenic 
carbon dioxide emissions). 
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and-control and market-based emissions schemes. 14  Perhaps the most 
famous agreement dedicated to climate change and the reduction of 
greenhouse gases is the Kyoto Protocol (Protocol).15 In 1997, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Control (UNFCCC) created the 
Kyoto Protocol, a treaty in which Member States agreed to the task of 
reducing their carbon dioxide emissions. 16  The Protocol established an 
initial five-year commitment period, from 2008 to 2012, for Member States 
to achieve their reduction goals.17  The Protocol also created mandatory 
reduction targets during the commitment period that are at least five percent 
below the countries’ 1990 emissions levels.18 In 2012, the Member States 
agreed to extend the Kyoto Protocol for a few years and to commit to more 
ambitious actions to reduce greenhouse gases.19 
One of the principal means of reducing greenhouse gases suggested 
by the Kyoto Protocol was an emissions trading system.20 Emissions trading 
systems involve exchanging credits, which permit the holder to emit a 
predetermined amount of carbon dioxide.21 Actors that emit more than their 
credit limit can purchase additional credits while those who emit less than 
their credit limit can sell their unused credits.22 Under this theory, actors 
                                                                                                                           
 14. See Reagan, supra note 10, at 350 (discussing how regulatory bodies over the past 
two decades have “moved beyond command-and-control regulation” and have begun using 
market-based systems like emissions trading). 
 15. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nationals Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. 
 16. See id. at art. 2 (defining the goals of the Kyoto Protocol). 
 17. See id. at art. 3, para. 1 (stating that Member States must “ensure that their 
aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions . . . do not exceed their 
assigned amounts, . . . with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at 
least 5 percent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012”). Additionally, in 
2012, delegates from Kyoto Protocol Member States decided to extend the Protocol for “a 
few years.” John M. Broder, Climate Talks Yield Commitment to Ambitious, but Unclear, 
Actions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2012, at A13 (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL 
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 18. See Veno, supra note 12, at 660 (discussing mandatory emission reduction targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol). 
 19. See Broder, supra note 17 (stating that the delegates from over 190 nations agreed 
to extend the Protocol and to use more ambitious, albeit unspecified, methods to combat 
emissions). 
 20. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 15, at art. 17 (“The Parties . . . may participate in 
emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3.”). 
 21. See Veno, supra note 12, at 660 (explaining that an emissions trading system 
issues credits to polluters, each credit allowing a set amount of emissions, and lets the 
polluters buy and sell each other’s credits in order to cover their respective amounts of 
pollution). 
 22. See id. (noting that an emissions trading system permits low emissions-producing 
entities to sell off their unused credits for profit, while high emissions-producing entities 
must buy credits to account for their pollution). 
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that can reduce emissions at a low cost will do so, while actors that are not 
financially equipped to reduce emissions will be able to purchase credits.23 
Essentially, the emissions trading system is a market-based scheme 
designed to reduce greenhouse gases in the most cost-effective method.24 
The European Union (EU) 25  has implemented an Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS) to meet its target Kyoto Protocol reductions, which 
represents the most ambitious emissions trading plan to date.26 Phase I of 
the ETS began in 2005 and only covered carbon dioxide emissions from 
“energy, metal production, mineral, and paper industries in EU member-
states.”27 Phase I represents the first wave of a planned EU implementation 
strategy, which will slowly tighten emissions targets and expand to include 
new industries.28 Under Directive 2008/101/EC (Aviation Directive) civil 
aviation was included in the EU ETS.29 The Aviation Directive extended 
emissions trading to the aviation industry by covering flights within the EU 
beginning in 2011 and all flights arriving and departing from the EU 
beginning on January 1, 2012.30 
                                                                                                                           
 23. See id. (explaining that, in theory, entities that cannot cut emissions cost 
effectively will buy credits from those entities that can do so cost effectively). 
 24. See Why Emissions Trading is More Effective than Command and Control, INT’L 
EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, 
http://www.ieta.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=418:why-emissions-
trading-is-more-effective-than-command-and-control&catid=54:3-minute-
briefing&Itemid=135 (last visited Sept. 10, 2013) (describing emissions trading and arguing 
that a cap and trade system “is the most effective way of minimizing the cost” of emissions 
reduction) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 25. The European Union is an economic and political union consisting of twenty-
seven Member States, which are primarily located throughout Europe. It was created to 
serve as “a political and economic community with supranational and intergovernmental 
features,” evidenced by the fact that Member States “delegated to the Union the exercise of 
certain national competencies.” Ruwantissa Abeyratne, The Authority of the European 
Union to Unilaterally Impose and Emissions Trading Scheme, 21 AIR & SPACE LAW., no. 4, 
2008, at 5–6. 
 26. See Reagan, supra note 10, at 350 (“The European Union (EU) has implemented 
its Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)—the most ambitious CO2 emissions trading scheme to 
date.”). 
 27. See id. (describing phase I of the ETS, including its starting date in 2005 and the 
industries that the regulation covered during that phase). 
 28. See id. at 363 (describing how phase I was just the first part of the scheme, with 
later phases expanding to cover more GHGs and industries while simultaneously tightening 
emissions caps). 
 29. See Council Directive 2008/101, 2009 O.J. (L 8) 3 (EC) [hereinafter Aviation 
Directive], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:008:0003:0021:EN:PDF (stating 
that the Directive’s purpose was to include aviation in the EU’s emissions trading scheme). 
 30. See id. at 17 (requiring that “[f]rom 1 January 2012 all flights which arrive at or 
depart from an aerodrome situated in the territory of a Member State” shall be subject to the 
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The aviation industry only produces a small portion of the total 
greenhouse gases, yet that percentage could grow.31 Civil aviation, like all 
transportation sectors, is working towards emissions reduction through 
efficiency; however, the EU’s extension of their ETS to the international 
community presents broader international legal ramifications with extra-
jurisdictional consequences. 32  Section I of this article will address the 
aviation industry and the role that it plays in global climate change. Section 
II will offer an in-depth analysis of the EU’s ETS, and the European 
Commission’s (“EC”) decision to include international aviation in the ETS. 
Section III discusses the legal implications of the EU’s Aviation Directive, 
the legal challenge before the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), the U.S. 
legislation blocking American air carriers from participating in the ETS, 
and problems with emissions related taxes to aviation. Finally, this article 
presents the alternative to a multilateral international aviation emissions 
target allowing for civil aviation to organically reach new efficiencies and 
alternatives. 
 
II. Civil Aviation Emissions and Global Climate Change 
A. Climate Change Overview 
 
The atmosphere is a fragile shield that protects the Earth while 
providing a temperature equilibrium that can sustain life.33 Typically, as 
sunlight penetrates the atmosphere, “carbon dioxide traps heat and warms 
the Earth.”34 The temperature on Earth is maintained by a delicate balance 
between energy input from the sun and energy lost back into space.35  
Since pre-industrial times the increase in GHGs has altered the 
energy balance in the climate system and is claimed to be one of the leading 
                                                                                                                 
EU ETS); Reagan, supra note 10, at 350 (noting that the Directive extends to cover flights 
within the EU in 2011 and all flights to or from the EU in 2012). 
 31. See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 18, 31 (stating that aviation 
carbon dioxide emissions only account for two percent of the world’s human-made carbon 
dioxide emissions and that aviation fuel consumption is anticipated to grow at a rate of 3.0% 
to 3.5% per year). 
 32. See AIR TRANSPORT ACTION GROUP, supra note 6, at 4 (explaining that the aviation 
industry has agreed to improve fleet fuel efficiency by 1.5% per year until 2020); see also 
Reagan, supra note 10, at 375 (stating that opponents of the EU Directive may challenge the 
Directive by arguing that EU member-states do not have jurisdiction to set emissions 
regulations extraterritorially). 
 33. See Veno, supra note 12, at 661 (explaining that the atmosphere plays an essential 
role in regulating the Earth’s temperature and keeping it from becoming “a cold, barren 
place”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. (explaining that Earth’s temperature is regulated by a give-and-take 
between heat coming from the sun and heat lost back into space). 
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drivers of climate change.36 GHGs “affect the absorption, scattering, and 
emissions of radiation within the atmosphere and at the Earth’s surface.”37 
The subsequent positive or negative radiation changes in the energy balance 
is expressed as radiative forcing,38 “which is used to compare warming or 
cooling influences on the global climate.”39 
Human activities have increased the atmospheric concentrations of 
three major GHGs: carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane.40 Since 
1992, concentrations of carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane, have 
increased by 30%, 15%, and 145% respectively.41 Research from the IPCC 
shows that “[m]any greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere for a long 
time,” and in the case of carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide, several 
decades.42 Consequently, if carbon dioxide emissions remained at 1990s 
levels, “they would lead to a nearly constant rate of increase in atmospheric 
concentrations for at least two centuries.”43 
While it is difficult to determine the exact result of climate change 
in the future—from the dire to the benign—there is no single mitigation 
measure available.44 Instead there is a global hodgepodge of legislation and 
treaties aimed at reducing carbon dioxide output. 45  The result of this 
patchwork approach is that some policies impact specific industries on a 
                                                                                                                           
 36. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 36–37 (2007) [hereinafter SYNTHESIS REPORT] (explaining that global 
GHG emissions have grown since pre-industrial times and that changes in atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs drives climate change). 
 37. Id. at 37. 
 38. See id. at 36 n.4 (“Radiative forcing is a measure of the influence a factor has in 
altering the balance of incoming and outgoing energy in the Earth-atmosphere system and is 
an index of the importance of the factor as a potential climate change mechanism.”). 
 39. Id. at 37. 
 40. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, AVIATION AND THE 
GLOBAL ATMOSPHERE: SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 4 (1999) [hereinafter IPCC Report, 
AVIATION AND THE GLOBAL ATMOSPHERE] (explaining that atmospheric concentrations of 
these three gases have grown significantly and much of the growth is attributable to human 
activities); see also SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 36, at 37 (“Global atmospheric 
concentrations of CO2, CH4, and N2O have increased markedly as a result of human 
activities since 1750.”). 
 41. See IPCC Report, AVIATION AND THE GLOBAL ATMOSPHERE, supra note 40, at 4 
(summarizing conclusions from the 1995 IPCC Second Assessment Report on the effect of 
anthropogenic emissions on climate change). 
 42. See id. (discussing the long length of time that greenhouse gases stay in the 
atmosphere). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 36, at 73 (“A wide range of [climate change] 
mitigation options is currently available or projected to be available by 2030 in all sectors.”). 
 45. See id. at 62 (showing the myriad types of policy instruments and actions that 
countries have taken to affect emissions). 
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scale much greater than their actual contribution to climate change—which 
is especially true for international aviation.46 
 
B. Aviation and Climate Change 
 
Aviation plays a key role in the global economy and serves as the 
most efficient passenger and cargo transport available. 47  International 
aviation has increased rapidly over the last few decades alongside the 
growth of the world economy.48 These international flights, however, do 
contribute to the build-up of anthropogenic gases in the atmosphere.49 
Aircrafts produce the same types of emissions as other vehicles 
with fossil fuel combustion engines.50 Jet engines, like many other vehicles, 
produce carbon dioxide, water vapor, and nitrous oxide, as well as other 
trace elements.51 Aircraft engine emissions are comprised of approximately 
seventy percent carbon dioxide, thirty percent water vapor, and less than 
one percent other various pollutants.52 In addition to the emissions that take 
place during flight, “[a]bout 10 percent of aircraft emissions of all types, 
except hydrocarbons and CO [carbon monoxide], are produced during 
airport ground level operations and during landing and takeoff.” 53  The 
majority of aviation emissions, however, take place at much higher 
altitudes.54 
                                                                                                                           
 46. See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 38 (recognizing that the total 
amount of carbon dioxide emissions from aviation accounts for only two percent of global 
carbon dioxide emissions). 
 47. See AIR TRANSPORT ACTION GROUP, supra note 6, at 2 (“Aviation provides the 
only rapid worldwide transportation network, which makes it essential for global business 
and tourism. It plays a vital role in facilitating economic growth.”); see also Veno, supra 
note 12, at 672 (explaining that international air transport is important for the world 
economy because it can carry passengers and cargo over long distances in short time 
periods). 
 48. See IPCC Report, AVIATION AND THE GLOBAL ATMOSPHERE, supra note 40, at 3 
(discussing the correlation between the growth in the world economy and the growth in the 
aviation industry). 
 49. See Veno, supra note 12, at 672 (discussing the effects that international flights 
have on greenhouse gas emissions); see also ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, 
at 31 (“International flights are responsible for approximately 62% of [total aviation] 
emissions.”). 
 50. See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 38 (discussing the type of 
emissions released by aircraft engines and the effect they have on climate change). 
 51. OFFICE OF ENV’T & ENERGY, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AVIATION & EMISSIONS: A 
PRIMER 1 (2005) [hereinafter AVIATION & EMISSIONS] (providing an overview of the 
emissions released by aircraft engines). 
 52. See id. (discussing the composition of aircraft emissions). 
 53. Id. at 2. 
 54. See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 38 (“[M]ost of these 
emissions are released directly into the upper troposphere and lower stratospheres.”). 
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Aircrafts emit carbon dioxide and water vapor directly into the 
upper troposphere and lower stratosphere where they have a different 
impact on atmospheric composition. 55  Currently, aviation emissions 
contribute to approximately two to three percent of the greenhouse gas 
emissions worldwide.56 This figure, however, is expected to rise both in 
terms of absolute emissions and the total percentage.57 “[I]n the last ten 
years, the airline industry has grown in absolute size, showing an increased 
diversity in the categorization of airlines operating in the different markets. 
Thanks to liberalization in many countries, completely new types of airlines 
have been entering the air transport market.”58 As a result of this growth, 
emissions from aircrafts have continued to increase every year. 59  The 
aviation industry, however, remains committed to addressing aviation’s 
contribution to climate change by aggressively working toward a 
sustainable future.60 
 
III. The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
A. The Kyoto Protocol and EU ETS 
 
The Kyoto Protocol established a legally binding agreement with 
the commitment of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by setting target 
levels of reduction.61 The Protocol entered into force on February 15, 2005, 
                                                                                                                           
 55. See id. at 38–39 (explaining that aircraft typically operate at cruising altitudes of 
8,000–13,000 meters (26,000–40,000 feet), making the non-CO2 impacts on climate variable 
because of the variable lifespans for these emissions). 
 56. See AVIATION & EMISSIONS, supra note 51, at 10 (“[E]missions of the world’s 
aircraft fleet [are] at about three percent of the total greenhouse emissions from fossil fuel, 
the majority of which come from commercial aviation.”). But see ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL 
REPORT, supra note 5, at 18 (explaining that, while fuel efficiency is expected to improve, 
“an emissions ‘gap’ could exist relative to 2006 or earlier . . . ”). 
 57. See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 19 (“A decrease in fares has 
encouraged people of all incomes to travel more, causing a growth in air travel demand 
significantly larger than what economic growth alone would have created.”). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See AVIATION & EMISSIONS, supra note 51, at 10 (“According to the projection, 
aircraft greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. will increase 60 percent by 2025.”). But see 
ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 45 (“[Discussions] of current total annual 
global CO2 emissions . . . are of limited value. What is important is the total of emissions 
over time. In the absence of policy intervention, aviation emissions of CO2 are projected to 
increase over 2005 levels by 1.9 to 4.5 fold by 2050.”). 
 60. See ICAO ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 35 (“[The International Civil 
Aviation Organization] and its Member States, with relevant organizations[,] will also keep 
working together in undertaking further work on medium and long-term goals, including 
exploring the feasibility of goals of more ambition . . . .”). 
 61. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 15, at Annex B (outlining the quantified emission 
limitation or reduction commitment made by each signatory Party). 
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and requires all Annex I countries to implement procedures to help achieve 
their target emissions level, including enhancing energy efficiency, 
protecting and improving sinks,62 researching and developing new forms of 
energy, and encouraging appropriate emissions reforms.63 “As signatories 
of the Protocol, the EU and its Member States obligated themselves to 
make measurable greenhouse gas emissions reductions.”64 
The European Union had long endorsed environmental legislation 
that favored command-and-control regulations.65 In the 1990s, however, the 
EU transitioned away from command-and-control in favor of the more 
American system of market-based regulations.66 After Kyoto was adopted, 
European Union Member States found that a market-based regulation 
scheme would be the most cost-effective method of meeting the emissions 
reductions mandated by the Protocol.67 
In order to meet the emissions reductions required by the Kyoto 
Protocol, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme was created and 
began operating in January of 2005, allowing Member States to distribute 
carbon dioxide credits to companies that emitted large quantities of 
GHGs.68 By capping the number of credits, the EU essentially created a 
market for carbon allowances.69 If an operator does not use all the credits 
allocated to it, then it has the ability to sell the credits to another operator 
                                                                                                                           
 62. See id. at art. 1 (“‘Sink’ means any process, activity or mechanism which removes 
a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.”). 
 63. See id at art. 2(1)(a)(i)–(viii) (“Each Party included in Annex I in achieving its 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3 shall [i]mplement 
and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance with its national 
circumstances.”). 
 64. Reagan, supra note 10, at 362. 
 65. See id. at 362 n.120 (“Command-and-control systems are generally programs of 
centralized regulatory commands issued in excruciating detail via permits to pollution 
dischargers throughout a jurisdiction in order to implement environmental goals.”). 
 66. See id. at 362 (explaining that the increased support for an EU transition “to 
market-based regulatory mechanisms, [was] in large part due to the American experience 
with such regulation”). 
 67. See id. (describing European support for finding a “low-cost means to attain the 
emissions reductions mandated by the Protocol”). 
 68. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, EUROPEAN ACTION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE: THE EU 
EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME, at 5 (2009) [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMISSION], available at 
http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/1_avrupa_birligi/1_6_raporlar/1_3_diger/environment/eu
_emmissions_trading_scheme.pdf (“Launched at the start of 2005, the EU ETS is the 
world’s first international company-level ‘cap-and-trade’ system of allowances for emitting 
carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 69. See Abeyratne, supra note 25, at 5 (discussing the structure of the EU ETS 
program and how carbon allowances can be traded). 
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that exceeded its allowance.70 “The theory behind the scheme is that as the 
demand for credits increases, the price will increase; thus, it will eventually 
be cheaper for companies to invest in innovative ways to cut emissions than 
to purchase more credits.”71 Ideally, emissions cuts would be made at the 
lowest possible cost to the economy under this scheme.72 The EC employed 
a phased introduction of the ETS to allow for periodic review and 
amendment.73 
The first phase began in 2005, and was limited to carbon dioxide 
emissions from industrial installations in energy, metal production, mineral, 
and paper industries, which account for nearly half of the EU’s carbon 
dioxide emissions. 74  As the phases progress, more industries will be 
included to cover more of the GHGs, while progressively tightening the 
emissions caps.75 The second phase of the ETS was set to coincide with the 
first Kyoto Protocol commitment period, which ran from 2008 to 2012.76 
During these stages of the ETS, EU Member States developed 
National Allocation Plans, which established how many emissions credits 
to issue and how to apportion them to individual companies.77 The EC then 
reviewed the allocation plans to ensure that they were consistent with the 
emission reduction commitments set forth in the Kyoto Protocol.78  The 
ultimate goal of the ETS is to ensure that the EU is sufficiently reducing its 
carbon dioxide emissions to comply with the Kyoto Protocol.79 
 
                                                                                                                           
 70. See id. (“To comply, facilities can either reduce their emissions or purchase 
allowances from facilities with an excess of allowances. Progressively tightening caps are 
foreseen for each new period, forcing overall reductions in emissions.”). 
 71. Veno, supra note 12, at 670. 
 72. See id. (explaining that when the burden to cut emissions is put on the least 
expensive mechanism available, “emissions reductions will be made at the lowest cost to the 
economy”). 
 73. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 68, at 8 (describing each phase of the EU 
ETS implementation). 
 74. See id. (stating that the first phase of implementation was a pilot phase focusing on 
establishing a price for carbon allowances and collecting emissions data). 
 75. See id. (noting that phases II and III will focus on reducing the allowed emissions 
based on data collected in phase I). 
 76. See id. (explaining that phase II of the ETS implementation process is meant to 
coincide with the “first commitment period” of the Kyoto Protocol). 
 77. See id. at 9 (“Member States are currently required to draw up national allocation 
plans for each trading period setting out how many allowances each installation will receive 
each year.”). 
 78. See id. at 15–16 (explaining that, after member-states construct National 
Allocation Plans for the distribution of credits, the EC reviews and assesses each allocation 
plan based on specific criteria). 
 79. See id. (describing the process by which the EC required member-states to align 
their allocation plans with the commitments made under the Kyoto Protocol). 
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B. The Aviation Directive 
 
The Environmental Commission of the EU adopted the Directive to 
include aviation within the ETS on December 20, 2006. 80  This was 
introduced into the ETS in two phases.81 First, starting in 2011, flights 
between domestic airports would be required to account for their 
emissions.82 Then, in 2012, the ETS was set to be extended to cover all 
flights arriving at or departing from an EU airport.83 The EU, however, 
postponed the application of the ETS to flights departing the EU through 
2013 pending international action on aviation emissions.84  
Under the Aviation Directive, EU Member States would allocate 
carbon dioxide credits to airlines much like the system set up for industrial 
installments under the ETS.85 These allocations would be capped based on 
the 2004–06 emissions levels of commercial airlines.86 “Airlines only have 
                                                                                                                           
 80. See Aviation Directive, supra note 29, at 3 (“[A]mending Directive 2003/87/EC so 
as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
within the Community.”). 
 81. See Press Release, European Union, Climate Change: Commission Proposes 
Bringing Air Transport into EU Emissions Trading Scheme (Dec. 20, 2006), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-1862_en.htm (“From 2011 all domestic and 
international flights between EU airports will be covered, and from 2012 the scope will be 
extended to all international flights arriving at or departing from EU airports.”) (on file with 
the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 82. See id. (describing the implementation of the EU ETS and noting the projected 
reduction of 183 million tons of CO2 emissions). 
 83. See id. (noting that all airlines will be treated equally under the EU ETS); see also 
Carl Burleson, The EU Emissions Trading System Proposal, 21 AIR & SPACE LAW., No. 3, 
2007, at 22–23 (“For example, under the proposed legislation, on a flight from Los Angeles 
to Paris, United Airlines would have to obtain permits to cover not only the emissions of the 
flight in French airspace but in U.S. and international airspace over the Atlantic in order to 
operate to Paris.”). But see Aviation Directive, supra note 29, at 6 (noting that where a third 
country puts in place measures to reduce the climate change impact of aviation, the ETS 
would not apply to flights arriving from that country). 
 84. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Your Biggest Carbon Sin May Be Air Travel, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 26, 2013, at SR4 (“[A]fter airlines and governments in the United States, India and 
China went ballistic — filing lawsuits, threatening trade actions and prompting legislation 
— the European Commission said it would delay full implementation for just one year to let 
the naysayers accede to an alternative global plan to reduce airlines’ carbon footprint.”) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
 85. See Press Release, European Union, Questions & Answers on Aviation & Climate 
Change, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-06-506_en.htm (“Like 
industrial installations, airlines will receive tradable allowances to emit a certain level of 
CO2 per year from their flights.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 86. See id. (“For the trading periods up until 2022, aviation emissions will be capped 
at the average level for the years 2004–2006. However, should international aviation be 
brought into a global climate agreement after 2012, this cap could be reviewed.”). 
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to maintain present [emissions] levels, which differs from other installments 
that are required to reduce their emissions to 1990 levels.”87 According to 
the Directive, each aircraft operator, including those from non-EU 
countries, would be administered under the program by only one Member 
State. 88  “For EU [aircraft] operators, the administering state [is] the 
Member State that issued their operating certificate; for the third-country 
operators, it [will] be the Member State to which most of their emissions 
can be attributed.” 89  The Aviation Directive essentially integrates the 
airlines into the ETS market so that airlines can buy and sell allowances 
from any other industry.90 
Just like any other ETS participants, aircraft operators would be 
required to monitor their emissions of carbon dioxide and report them to 
their administering Member State by March 31 each year.91 Any airline that 
does not stay within its allotted emissions will have to pay a fine at the end 
of the year, and could possibly lose its contract to fly to or from EU 
airports.92  According to the Convention Between the United States and 
Other Governments Respecting International Civil Aviation (Chicago 
                                                                                                                           
 87. Veno, supra note 12, at 675. 
 88. See Daniel Calleja Crespo & Mike Crompton, The European Approach to Aviation 
and Emissions Trading, 21 AIR & SPACE LAW., no. 3, 2007, at 1, 20 (explaining that this 
form of administration avoids duplication and an excessive administrative burden on aircraft 
operators). 
 89. Id.; see also Abeyratne, supra note 25, at 5 (“The Scheme would exclude flights 
by State aircraft, flights under visual flight rules, circular flights (or circuits), flights for 
testing navigation equipment or for training purposes, rescue flights, and flights by aircraft 
with a maximum take-off weight of less than 5,700 kilograms (approximately 12,500 
pounds).”). 
 90. See Reagan, supra note 10, at 364 (“The Proposed Directive would integrate the 
airlines into the prior-existing ETS market so that the airlines could buy and sell allowances 
across industries.”). 
 91. See Abeyratne, supra note 25, at 5 (describing how reports will be independently 
verified by the competent authority of their administering Member State to ensure their 
accuracy); see also Veno, supra note 12, at 677 (“To monitor emissions airlines must report 
their annual emissions by multiplying the amount of fuel they consumed that year by a 
standard emission factor. If the airline is not capable of documenting the amount of fuel used 
for each flight, then a standardized fuel consumption estimation will be applied.”). 
 92. See Veno, supra note 12, at 672–77 (discussing the inclusion of aviation in the EU 
ETS and the penalties that airlines will suffer for failing to stay within their allotted 
emissions). 
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Convention),93 all airlines must comply with the laws and regulations of the 
state in which they arrive and depart, including the Aviation Directive.94 
 
C. Justification for Including Aviation in the ETS 
 
While the Kyoto Protocol calls for the domestic reduction of 
aviation emissions for developed nations, it provides for the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 95  to guide the overall international 
aviation emissions reduction.96 In the EU, the inclusion of just domestic 
aviation would only be a partial solution.97 The EC contended that for any 
meaningful reduction to take place international aviation must be included 
since it is responsible for the vast majority of the aviation industry’s carbon 
dioxide emissions.98 “EU GHG emissions from international aviation grew 
by 87 percent between 1990 and 2004.”99 Although only three percent of 
EU greenhouse gas emissions are produced by aviation, “the EC projects 
that by 2012, emissions from international flights would increase by 150% 
from 1990 levels.”100 Furthermore, this projected growth could offset EU 
Kyoto Protocol reductions by up to twenty-five percent.101 With the amount 
of anticipated growth in the international aviation sector, the European 
                                                                                                                           
 93. Convention Between the United States of America and Other Governments 
Respecting International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 
[hereinafter Chicago Convention]. 
 94. See id. (“The laws and regulations of a contracting State as to the admission to or 
departure from its territory of passengers, crew or cargo of aircraft . . . shall be complied 
with . . . upon entrance into or departure from, or while within the territory of that State.”).  
 95. See Veno, supra note 12, at 673 (“The ICAO is an organization created under the 
Chicago Convention agreement to oversee international flight regulations and procedures. 
The ICAO is composed of 188 countries, encompassing the entire field of international civil 
aviation, and it has legislative ‘authority to promulgate standards and recommended 
practices (SARPs).’”). 
 96. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 15, at art. 2 § 2 (“The Parties included in Annex I 
shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through the International 
Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization, respectively.”).  
 97. See Reagan, supra note 10, at 364 (“While the inclusion of domestic aviation into 
the ETS for member-states is a partial solution to the emissions problem, the EC posits that 
any meaningful emissions reduction measures must also include international aviation 
because it accounts for the vast majority of EU flights.”). 
 98. See id. (explaining that international aviation accounts for the vast majority of EU 
flights). 
 99. Crespo & Crompton, supra note 88, at 19. 
 100. Reagan, supra note 10, at 364–65. 
 101. See id. at 365 (explaining that emissions from international flights in the near 
future could offset existing emission reduction plans).  
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Commission claims that failing to work toward emissions reduction in this 
industry would ultimately undermine the overall efforts of the ETS.102 
The European Commission acknowledged that under the Kyoto 
Protocol, authorization over international aviation emissions was delegated 
to the ICAO.103 Since the Protocol was agreed upon in 1997, EU Member 
States and the ICAO had been working on creating a market-based 
emissions trading system.104 After studying various means to put such a 
system into practice, the ICAO Committee on Aviation Environmental 
Protection agreed in 2004 “that an aviation-specific emissions trading 
system based on a new legal instrument under the ICAO auspices 
‘. . . seemed sufficiently unattractive that it should not be pursued 
further.’”105 Later that same year, the ICAO Assembly announced that work 
on any further implementation “should focus on two approaches: voluntary 
emissions trading and the incorporation of international aviation into a 
State’s existing emissions trading schemes.”106 The EC adopted the latter 
approach in its proposal and continues to cooperate with the ICAO in 
emission reductions.107 
In sum, the EC contends that bringing aviation into the ETS will 
place pressure on the industry as a whole to mitigate the impacts from 
GHGs.108 Supporters of the regulation project allege that it will provide 
incentives for international airlines to develop “green” or more efficient 
technology.109 In addition, the proposal could strengthen the carbon market 
as airlines will be able to trade emissions credits across industry lines.110 
Conversely, the EU’s proposal has sparked debate over the legal 
implications of including international aviation in the ETS.111 
 
                                                                                                                           
 102. See Rosenthal, supra note 84 (discussing American, Chinese, and Indian efforts to 
evade participation in the EU ETS).  
 103. See Reagan, supra note 10, at 365 (expressing the EC’s understanding of which 
organization currently mandates international aviation emissions).  
 104. See id. (describing the EC’s efforts to alter the existing international aviation 
emissions reduction effort). 
 105. Crespo & Crompton, supra note 88, at 19. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Rosenthal, supra note 84 (“[T]he European Union commissioner [for climate 
action], said that if the International Civil Aviation Organization fails to come up with a 
solid, market-based program in September, the European Union will begin collecting the 
emissions fees for all flights in and out of its airports.”).  
 108. See Reagan, supra note 10, at 365 (describing how regulation will inevitably 
change the industry’s emission mitigation efforts). 
 109. See id. (discussing the possible outcomes of the regulation project).  
 110. See id. (describing a potential benefit that could arise from the EU’s ETS 
proposal).  
 111. See id. (highlighting the adverse reactions from nations and aviation associations 
outside of the EU’s proposal).  
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IV. Implications of the Aviation Directive 
 
The decision to include non-EU operators into the ETS drew broad 
criticism from international air carriers and the governments of the United 
States, China, and India. 112  Specifically, the Chinese Aviation 
Administration ordered Chinese airlines to boycott the ETS and former 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton strongly objected to the ETS on legal and 
policy grounds. 113  In addition, the Aviation Transport Association of 
America (ATA) and other major U.S. airlines brought a lawsuit before the 
European Court of Justice, Europe’s highest court, “asserting that the 
extraterritorial regulation of non-EU operators in the ETS is unlawful and 
breaches customary international law and international agreements.”114 
 
A. International Aviation Law 
 
The EC contends that the Aviation Directive is within its authority 
under the current international aviation regulatory framework.115 EU ETS 
proponents equate the proposal to admission and departure requirements 
permitted under the Chicago Convention. 116  Article 1 of the Chicago 
Convention confirms that every State has exclusive sovereignty over the 
airspace above its territory. 117  Article 6 provides that “[n]o scheduled 
international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a 
contracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization 
of that State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or 
authorization.”118 Furthermore, under Article 11, a contracting State may 
apply admissions and departure requirements to international aircraft 
entering or leaving the state, so long as they are applied without distinction 
to nationality and in accordance with the provisions of the Chicago 
                                                                                                                           
 112. See Rosenthal, supra note 84 (discussing the lawsuits filed and threats of trade 
action made by air carriers and governments in response to the EU’s ETS proposal). 
 113. See Roger Martella et al., Lessons Learned: The EU and its Aviation Directive, 43 
TRENDS, Mar./Apr. 2012 at 1 (describing the adverse responses to the EU’s ETS proposal). 
 114. Id. at 1. 
 115. See Reagan, supra note 10, at 369 (explaining the EU’s argument that the 
regulation is legal under the existing aviation regulatory framework). 
 116. See id. at 369–70 (analogizing the EU’s ETS proposal to the admission and 
departure requirements permissible under the Chicago Convention and air service 
agreements (ASAs)).  
 117. See Chicago Convention, supra note 94, at art. 1 (“The contracting States 
recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above 
its territory.”). 
 118. Id. at art. 6. 
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Convention. 119  Based upon these provisions, the EU contends that the 
Chicago Convention supports the extension of ETS to international 
aviation.120 
On the other hand, opponents of the Aviation Directive can provide 
an equally compelling case that the regulation is impermissible under the 
Chicago Convention.121 As previously mentioned, Article 1 of the Chicago 
Convention gives a State exclusive jurisdiction over its territorial 
airspace.122 In this case, however, the EU proposed to extend the ETS to all 
flights arriving at or departing from an EU airport, while exempting those 
countries that establish measures to reduce the climate change impact of 
aviation.123 
Under international law, a state can only apply jurisdiction beyond 
its territorial limits when the conduct being regulated has a substantial 
effect within its territory.124 Although a state can gain jurisdiction over 
conduct outside its territory, “[A] state may not exercise jurisdiction to 
prescribe with respect to a person or activity having connections with 
another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.”125 
Essentially, if the extension of jurisdiction is found to be unreasonable, then 
the state cannot exert authority beyond its borders.126 
In addition to the extra-jurisdictional issues associated with the 
Aviation Directive, the EU ETS also imposed potential penalties and costs 
associated with compliance on international airlines.127 These costs could 
                                                                                                                           
 119. See id. at art. 11 (“[T]he laws and regulations of a contracting State relating to the 
admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation 
. . . shall be applied to the aircraft of all contracting States without distinction as to 
nationality.”). 
 120. See Reagan, supra note 10, at 370 (describing the EU’s conclusion that the ETS 
incorporation of aviation is legal because it is similar to the Chicago Convention). 
 121. See id. at 371 (explaining that opponents of the Aviation Directive argue that the 
plan “amounts to an impermissible operating requirement, tax, or charge, or . . . that the EC 
lacks jurisdiction to prescribe emissions regulation to operation in international aviation”). 
 122. See Chicago Convention, supra note 94, at art. 1 (“The contracting States 
recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above 
its territory.”). 
 123. See Abeyratne, supra note 25, at 6 (describing how the EU is attempting to extend 
its carbon dioxide emissions trading scheme to include conduct outside of its territory, 
namely international flights). 
 124. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1)(c) (1987) (“[A] 
state has jurisdiction to proscribe law with respect to conduct outside its territory that has or 
is intended to have substantial effect within its territory . . . .”). 
 125. Id. § 403(1). 
 126. See id. § 403(2)(a)–(h) (describing the factors for determining whether the use of 
jurisdiction is unreasonable). 
 127. See Rosenthal, supra note 84 (explaining that the EU ETS would cost US airlines 
$3.1 billion between 2012 and 2020). 
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functionally be construed as a tax or fee that is not related to the cost of 
providing aeronautic facilities or services. 128  Article 15 of the Chicago 
Convention specifically prohibits the imposition of fees on airlines for the 
right of transit over, exit from, or entry into the contracting State.129 It 
seems that the EU’s legislation would require international airlines to pay 
for emissions allowances simply for the right to land or take off. 130 
“Although there is not a direct charge placed on airlines, the stringent 
requirements under the EU ETS would require that airlines pay a ‘charge’ 
to emit carbon when flying into those airports, and any airlines that do not 
comply could possibly lose their contract at those airports.”131 The airline 
receives nothing in return for this charge, with the exception of being able 
to operate within the EU.132 Therefore, the Aviation Directive could be 
construed as a violation of Article 15 of the Chicago Convention.133 
As a result, the aforementioned EU contention that Article 11 
provides authority for the inclusion of aviation in the ETS would be 
rendered moot.134 Article 11 is limited in that the laws and regulations of 
contracting States pertaining to admission and departure must be consistent 
with the provisions of the Chicago Convention.135 If the Aviation Directive 
is found to be in violation of Article 15, the EU will not be able to rely on 
Article 11 to justify its inclusion of international aviation in the ETS.136 The 
                                                                                                                           
 128. See Burleson, supra note 83, at 23 (discussing the variety of problems that have 
been associated with the EU ETS). 
 129. See Chicago Convention, supra note 94, at art. 15(b) (“No fees, dues or other 
charges shall be imposed by any contracting State in respect solely of the right of transit over 
or entry into or exit from its territory of any aircraft of a contracting State or persons or 
property thereon.”). 
 130. See Burleson, supra note 83, at 23–24 (explaining how the EU ETS violates article 
15 of the Chicago Convention by requiring airlines to pay for emissions allowances in order 
to land or take off within the EU). 
 131. Veno, supra note 12, at 685. 
 132. See Burleson, supra note 83, at 23 (describing the reasons that the airline industry 
is opposed to the EU ETS). 
 133. See Charles E. Smith, Air Transportation Taxation: The Case for Reform, 75 J. 
AIR L. & COM. 915, 939 (2010) (“It is a well known—but publicly ignored—fact that several 
foreign governments may violate this sentence [of Article 15 of the Chicago Convention] by 
charging air passengers a fee merely for the privilege of entering or exiting the country. 
Chile, for example, charges an ‘Entry Fee’ of $131.”).  
 134. See Burleson, supra note 83, at 23 (explaining that the EU does not have the 
authority to promulgate the ETS under Article 11 of the Chicago Convention). 
 135. See id. at 23–24 (arguing that the EU’s reading of Article 11 of the Chicago 
Convention would result in virtually no restriction of a signatories right to impose charges 
for international aviation on airlines, contrary to Article 11). 
 136. See id. at 24 (discussing the applicability of Articles 11 and 15 of the Chicago 
Convention to the EU ETS).  
ENVIRONMENTAL OVERREACH 19 
 
 
viability of any challenge to the Aviation Directive under Article 15 would 
ultimately hinge on what constitutes a charge or a tax.137 
 
B. European Court of Justice 
 
On December 21, 2011, the European Court of Justice rejected the 
claims of an airline trade association and three U.S. airlines that the 
inclusion of international air carriers in the EU ETS violated customary 
international law and international treaties.138 In deciding the case, the ECJ 
examined two questions.139 First, the court determined whether the plaintiff 
airlines and trade association—as individuals and not state actors—could 
use international agreements and customary international law to challenge 
the Aviation Directive.140 Second, the court looked at whether those laws, if 
applicable, would invalidate the Directive.141 
From the outset, the ECJ stated that the Chicago Convention did 
not bind the EU.142 The court reasoned that although all twenty-seven EU 
Member States were a party to the treaty, the EU, as a separate entity had 
not signed the agreement.143 Rather, the EU was merely an observer under 
the Chicago Convention.144 Therefore, the court determined that plaintiffs 
could not use the Chicago Convention to challenge the validity of the 
Aviation Directive.145 
                                                                                                                           
 137. See Reagan, supra note 10, at 374 (describing how EU representatives argue that 
emissions trading is distinct from a charge or tax and how opponents to the EU’s proposal 
argue is a charge or tax because it is a unilaterally imposed cost). 
 138. See generally Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Sec’y of State for 
Energy & Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. 00000 (Dec. 21, 2011). 
 139. See id. ¶ 45 (setting out the issues left to be addressed in this case); see also JANE 
A. LEGGETT ET. AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42392, AVIATION AND THE EUROPEAN 
UNION’S EMISSION TRADING SCHEME 23 (2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42392.pdf (summarizing the European Court of Justice’s 
opinion). 
 140. See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. ¶ 45 (noting that the court must examine 
customary international law, the Chicago Convention, the Open Skies Agreement, and the 
Kyoto Protocol in order to determine whether the EU directive is challengeable). 
 141. See id. (explaining that the court will undergo a similar analytic structure as the 
first issue, whether the EU directive is challengeable). 
 142. See id. ¶ 71 (explaining that EU Member States have not given over all control of 
aviation in their countries to the EU). 
 143. See id. ¶¶ 69–72 (describing the reason that the Chicago Convention does not 
apply to the EU). 
 144. See id. ¶¶ 69–70 (explaining that the EU has not assumed “exclusive competence 
in the entire field of international civil aviation” because some Member States have retained 
powers within the realm of the Chicago Convention).  
 145. See id. ¶ 72 (“It follows that in the context of the present reference for a 
preliminary ruling the Court cannot examine the validity of [the Aviation Directive] in the 
light of the Chicago Convention as such.”). 
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Conversely, the court found that the EU was indeed bound by the 
Kyoto Protocol.146 The airlines and trade association argued that the Kyoto 
protocol specifically named ICAO as the vehicle for aviation emissions 
reductions, and accordingly, that the EU must refrain from independent 
action. 147  The court, however, found that in order for an individual to 
challenge the validity of the Aviation Directive under an international 
agreement, the specific provision relied upon must be “unconditional and 
sufficiently precise so as to confer on persons subject to European Union 
law the right to rely thereon in legal proceedings in order to contest the 
legality of an act of European Union law.”148 With respect to the ICAO 
provision in the Kyoto Protocol, the court stated: 
 
[T]hat provision, as regards its content, cannot in any event 
be considered to be unconditional and sufficiently precise 
so as to confer on individuals the right to rely on it in legal 
proceedings in order to contest the validity of Directive 
2008/101. Consequently, the Kyoto Protocol cannot be 
relied upon in the context of the present reference for a 
preliminary ruling for the purpose of assessing the validity 
of Directive 2008/101.149 
 
Consequently, the plaintiffs could not rely upon either the Chicago 
Convention or the Kyoto Protocol in their challenge of the Aviation 
Directive.150  
Despite not allowing challenges to the Aviation Directive under the 
Chicago Convention or Kyoto Protocol, the court did allow the airlines and 
trade association to rely on the Open Skies Agreement and some principals 
of international customary law.151  Similar to Article 15 of the Chicago 
Convention, Article 11 of the Open Skies Agreement prohibits customs 
                                                                                                                           
 146. See id. ¶¶ 73–74 (evaluating whether the Kyoto Protocol precludes the court from 
determining the Aviation Directive’s validity and whether the Kyoto Protocol’s provisions 
give those subject to EU law the right to rely on Kyoto in order to challenge other EU laws).  
 147. See id. ¶¶ 43, 77 (stating that pleading the Aviation Directive was invalid). 
 148. Id. ¶ 74.  
 149. Id. ¶¶ 77–78. 
 150.  See id. ¶¶ 72, 78 (rejecting both laws as a basis to examine the Aviation Directive).  
 151. See id. ¶¶ 87, 94, 100, 111 (allowing evaluation of the Aviation Directive in light 
of the Open Skies Agreement and international law); see also LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 
139, at 25 (noting the plaintiff could “challenge the [Aviation] Directive pursuant to the 
customary international law principles of (1) complete state sovereignty over its airspace; (2) 
freedom of flight over the high seas; and (3) the high seas are free from state sovereignty”). 
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taxes or fees from being placed on fuel that is on board the aircraft.152 As 
such, the plaintiffs asserted that the EU ETS constituted an impermissible 
duty, tax, fee or charge on fuel consumption under the Open Skies 
Agreement.153  
In rejecting the claim that the EU ETS was a tax, the court 
acknowledged that the cost imposed on aircraft operators was, in part, 
based upon fuel consumption.154 The ECJ, however, ruled that “there is no 
direct and inseverable link between the quantity of the fuel held or 
consumed by an aircraft and the pecuniary burden on the aircraft’s operator 
in the context of the allowance trading scheme’s operation.”155 Indeed, the 
court went on to distinguish the EU ETS from a tax by noting that under the 
scheme, an airline could potentially make a profit by burning less fuel and 
selling the leftover allowances. 156  Ultimately, it was this distinction 
between a market-based measure and a tax that lead the ECJ to find the EU 
ETS permissible under Article 11 of the Open Skies Agreement.157  
The implication of this decision is that the ECJ sees a tax as only a 
fixed value.158 Taxes, however, often fluctuate based on the value of what is 
being taxed.159 For instance, taxes on fuel or real estate that are based on a 
                                                                                                                           
 152. See Air Transp. Ass’n. of Am., Inc. ¶ 136 (discussing arguments by the airlines and 
trade associations that fuel loads are exempted from duties, taxes, fees and charges under 
Article 11(1) and 2(c) of the Open Skies Agreement). 
 153. See id. (discussing Air Transportation Association of America’s contention that, 
“only charges based on the cost of the service provided can be imposed by the European 
Union” and that the scheme in the EU ETS directive does not fall within this exception); see 
also LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 139, at 25–26 (discussing the airlines’ and trade 
associations’ argument that the Aviation Directive “imposes an impermissible tax or duty 
levied on airline fuel”). 
 154. See Air Transp. Ass’n. of Am., Inc. ¶ 141 (noting that aircraft fuel consumption 
was part of the formula which calculated emissions); see also Katherine B. Andrus, Beyond 
Aircraft Emissions: The European Court of Justice’s Decision May have Far-Reaching 
Implications, 24 AIR & SPACE LAW. No. 4, 13, 16 (2012) (noting that the ECJ distinguishes 
costs from a fuel charge because it is a market-based measure). 
 155. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. ¶ 142. 
 156. See id. (“Nor can it be ruled out that an aircraft operator, despite having held or 
consumed fuel, will bear no pecuniary burden resulting from its participation in the 
allowance trading scheme, or will even make a profit by assigning its surplus allowances for 
consideration.”); see also LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 139, at 26 (noting the ECJ argument 
that the airlines could make a profit by burning less fuel and selling excess emission 
allowances).  
 157.  See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. ¶ 143–44 (noting a difference between the EU 
Aviation Directive and a Swedish scheme that taxed fuel consumption and constituted an 
unlawful excise duty on aviation).  
 158. See Andrus, supra note 154, at 16 (arguing that the ECJ implies a tax “must 
always use a fixed value”). 
 159. See id. (arguing that there are many examples which contradict the view that a tax 
is a fixed value).  
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percentage of the price will vary based upon the market price.160 “In the 
case of the [EU] ETS, it can just as easily be viewed as a tax on fuel that 
simply uses a different currency (i.e. allowances) that fluctuates in 
value.”161 While there is no direct charge per ton on the fuel consumed—
and subsequent carbon emitted—the chosen currency does not change the 
fact that the EU ETS operates as a tax.162 
 
C. EU Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011 
 
In response to the EU ETS, a historically divided 112th Congress 
swiftly approved—with large bi-partisan support—the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011 (EU ETS Prohibition 
Act).163 Arguably one of the greatest legislative accomplishments of 2012, 
the Act essentially functions as the title indicates: it prohibits U.S. aircraft 
operators from participating in the EU ETS.164 The EU ETS Prohibition Act 
allows the Secretary of Transportation to prohibit U.S. carriers from 
complying with the EU ETS based upon a public interest determination.165 
In making the public interest determination the Secretary must take into 
account: “(1) the impacts on U.S. consumers, U.S. carriers, and U.S. 
operators; (2) the impacts on the economic, energy, and environmental 
security of the United States; and (3) the impacts on U.S. foreign relations, 
including existing international commitments.”166 
                                                                                                                           
 160. See id. (“[A] fuel tax assessed as a percentage of the value of fuel consumed would 
fluctuate along with the price of fuel. Similarly, real estate taxes are typically calculated as a 
percentage of a property’s value, which in turn is based roughly on its market price, which 
may rise or fall.”).  
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. (arguing that because the cost imposed on aircraft operators is based on 
fuel consumption and charged at a rate set by the government, it constitutes a tax even if it 
could also be considered a market-based measure).  
 163. See European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, 49 
U.S.C. § 40101 (“An Act To prohibit operators of civil aircraft of the United States from 
participating in the European Union’s emissions trading scheme, and for other purposes.”); 
see also Rosenthal, supra note 84 (“[O]ne bill glided through Congress with broad bipartisan 
support and won a quick signature from President Obama . . . .”). 
 164. See id. (“The Secretary of Transportation shall prohibit an operator of a civil 
aircraft of the United States from participating in the emissions trading scheme unilaterally 
established by the European Union . . . .”); see also LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 139, at 31 
(noting that one possible consequence of the legislation is the exclusion of operators serving 
the EU from the EU aviation market).  
 165. See 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012) (describing the role and responsibility of the 
Secretary of Transportation under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
Prohibition Act of 2011). 
 166. Id. 
ENVIRONMENTAL OVERREACH 23 
 
 
In addition, the EU ETS Prohibition Act instructs the Secretary of 
Transportation and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
Administration to “use their authority to conduct international negotiations, 
including using their authority to conduct international negotiations to 
pursue a worldwide approach to address aircraft emissions.” 167  It also 
directs the Administrator to ensure that U.S. carriers are held harmless 
under the EU ETS.168  
The EU ETS Prohibition Act was, in part, ultimately effective; 
shortly after its passage, the EU, bending to international outcry, announced 
that it would delay implementation for a year.169 But the EU continued to 
pressure the ICAO to develop a market-based measure, threatening to 
resume collecting emissions fees on all flights beginning in September of 
2013.170 That effort has met with mixed success. Although the ICAO has 
since agreed to develop a plan over the next three years for an aviation 
emissions market to come online in 2020, ICAO did not allow the EU to 
subject airlines to its emissions scheme in the meantime.171 
 
D. Taxing Is No Solution 
 
On international flights, government taxes and fees can add up to 
$350 to the base fare of a ticket. 172  If allowed to rise unfettered, tax 
increases could erode passenger demand, undermining the numerous public 
and economic policy goals that aviation supports.173 “The problem with the 
                                                                                                                           
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. (“The Secretary of Transportation . . . take other actions under existing 
authorities that are in the public interest necessary to hold operators of civil aircraft of the 
United States harmless from the emissions trading scheme . . . .”). 
 169. See Rosenthal, supra note 84 (noting that the EU would delay implementation to 
allow opposing countries to agree on an alternative global plan for emission reduction). 
 170. See id. (requiring the ICAO to develop a global emissions plan or risk the EU 
collection of emission fees). 
 171. See Ewa Krukowska, Global Emissions Plan for Airlines Gets First UN Approval, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2013, 9:13 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-04/carbon-
cuts-loom-for-airlines-as-icao-eyes-global-market.html (discussing the UN’s approval of a 
market-based approach to reduce emissions by the airline industry) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 172. See Smith, supra note 133, at 915 (arguing that the airline industry is not solely to 
blame for the rise in costs of airfare and that government imposed fees are partly to blame). 
 173. See id. at 935 (“Aviation employs large numbers of people at various skill levels. 
This contributes greatly to local employment rates, tax bases, and disposable incomes. In 
addition, aviation stimulates economies by guaranteeing that firms have convenient access to 
much-needed air service.”). 
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European trading scheme is that it began with a market-based measure—a 
tax.”174  
A market-based measure is designed to influence behavior by 
providing financial incentives and disincentives for certain results.175 Taxes 
operate in a similar fashion, promoting the change of behavior to limit 
overall tax liability.176 For a market-based measure, the only real difference 
is that the market, rather than the government, determines the exact 
financial burden or benefit.177 The government, however, is still imposing a 
cost to influence behavior whether it is through the creation of the market 
or through a tax.178  
This fact goes to the root of the problem with the EU ETS, the need 
for incentives.179 International aviation already has the proper incentive to 
increase efficiency and reduce emissions, which can be summed up in two 
words: fuel costs.180 Jet fuel represents airlines’ largest cost, edging close to 
thirty percent of all operating expenses.181 “Annually, a 1 cent increase in a 
gallon costs U.S. airlines $175 million; a one dollar increase in a barrel 
costs them $415 million.”182 This provides all the incentives airlines need to 
reduce fuel consumption and, as a result, emissions.183 Indeed, U.S. airlines 
                                                                                                                           
 174. Rosenthal, supra note 84 (quoting Nancy Young, the vice president for 
environmental affairs of Airlines for America). 
 175. See Andrus, supra note 1544, at 16 (explaining that a market-based measure 
differs from a tax in the mechanism that is used and not the predictability of cost 
compliance). 
 176. See id. (“[T]he target of a tax may be expected to operate within certain limits to 
avoid paying higher taxes, or to invest in new equipment to receive a tax break.”). 
 177.  See id. (“The primary difference is that, for a market-based measure, the ‘market,’ 
rather than the government, sets the amount of the financial penalty or reward.”). 
 178. See id. (“[It] is still the government imposing that cost, whether it is styled a tax, 
charge, or market-based measure.”). 
 179. See LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 139, at 18–19 (demonstrating that the incentives 
for airlines to comply with the Aviation Directive are minimal when airlines pass the costs 
onto their customers). 
 180. See id. at 20 (arguing that higher fuel costs alone are sufficient to encourage 
efficiency and increased biofuel use, curbing emissions). 
 181. See A4A Quarterly Cost Index: U.S. Passenger Airlines, AIRLINES FOR AMERICA, 
http://www.airlines.org/Pages/A4A-Quarterly-Cost-Index-U.S.-Passenger-Airlines.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2013) (reporting that fuel per gallon is 28.3% of operating expenses) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 182. John Heimlich, The Price of Jet Fuel and Its Impact on U.S. Airlines, AIRLINES 
FOR AMERICA, http://www.airlines.org/Pages/The-Price-of-Jet-Fuel-and-Its-Impact-on-U.S.-
Airlines.aspx (last visited Sept. 11, 2013) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL 
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 183. See LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 137, at 20 (“Rising fuel expenses also require a 
rising share of airlines’ revenues, from around 12%–15% in 2002 to around 26%–35% in 
2010.”). 
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have reduced their fuel intensity (energy consumed per passenger mile) by 
forty-one percent, more than any other mode of transportation. 184  In 
addition, airlines are investing in a host of advances that will continue to 
save fuel and reduce emissions. 185  These include improved aircraft 
management, modernized aircraft fleets, and biomass-based fuels.186 Since 
the current market structure already provides incentives for airlines to 
reduce emissions there is no need for unilateral market-based measures or 




The Aviation Directive was developed to help the EU reach its 
target emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. 188  The Kyoto 
Protocol, however, specifically designated the ICAO as the entity that 
should regulate emissions from international aviation.189 Furthermore, the 
Chicago Convention charges the ICAO with creating uniformity in 
international aviation regulation. 190  Therefore, regardless of the ECJ 
opinion, the ICAO is the only appropriate body to decide whether it is even 
appropriate to develop, implement, and direct an international aviation 
emissions initiative.191 
The Aviation Directive embodies the fundamental flaw where 
unilateral action is forced upon other state actors in a misguided effort to 
address a perceived problem that is already being addressed on the 
                                                                                                                           
 184. See id. at 6 (discussing the improvement in airline fuel efficiency between 1990 
and 2008). 
 185. See id. at 6–7 (noting that more efficient aircraft designs, alternative fuels, and 
improved air traffic control will further reduce fuel usage). 
 186. See id. at 7 (noting that air traffic modernization efforts will reduce emissions by a 
predicted fourteen million tons, modernized aircraft fleets will lead to a twenty-five percent 
reduction in CO2 emissions, and the use of biomass fuels “can have a net CO2 emissions 
approaching zero”). 
 187.  See id. at 19 n.57 (arguing that the cost of fuel is a more significant driver of 
aviation fuel demand than carbon allowances). 
 188. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text (outlining the Kyoto Protocol’s and 
ICAO’s roles). 
 189. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 15, at art. 2, § 2 (assigning ICAO as one of several 
bodies responsible for reducing emissions). 
 190. See Chicago Convention, supra note 94, at art. 37 (charging the ICAO with 
adopting and amending international standards to ensure the highest degree of collaboration 
between contracting states). 
 191. See Reagan, supra note 10, at 380 (“International aviation emissions reductions 
should be aggressively pursued through the ICAO because it is responsive to the political, 
technical, and legal implications raised by the regulation.”). 
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international stage.192 The EU should not apply the ETS to international air 
carriers and should stop subverting the global efforts to reduce emissions.193 
The airline industry is committed to aggressive emissions reductions 
including “an annual average fuel and CO2 efficiency improvement of 1.5 
percent through 2020 and carbon-neutral growth from 2020, with an 
aspirational goal of a 50 percent reduction in CO2 by 2050 relative to 2005 
levels.”194 If, and only if, airlines cannot live up to these commitments 
should ICAO proceed with a tax or market-based measure seeking to limit 
emissions.195 
                                                                                                                           
 192.  See Sean Lengell, Europeans Eye Tough Emissions Rules for Airlines, WASH. 
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2006, at A3 (quoting Federal Aviation Association spokeswoman Laura 
Brown) (“Such a unilateral approach [by the EU] will prove unworkable and will undercut 
rather than support international efforts to implement system improvements to better manage 
aviation emissions impacts.”). 
 193. See Veno, supra note 12, at 687 (“If they impose this scheme despite the 
dissatisfaction of so many key players, they could in turn create an adverse effect of 
increasing the amount of carbon emissions from international aviation traffic.”). 
 194. ATA Challenges the Application of the EU ETS to U.S. Airlines, AIRLINES FOR 
AMERICA, 
http://www.airlines.org/Pages/ATA-challenges-the-application-of-the-EU-ETS-to-U.S.-
Airlines.aspx (last visited Sept. 11, 2013) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL 
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 195. See LEGGETT ET AL., supra note 139, at 23 (outlining the ATA arguments against 
the Aviation Directive, in particular “that any environmental standards or market-based 
mechanisms to reduce GHG from aviation should be implemented through ICAO”). 
